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1. Introduction
After 1989 changes in the agricultural sector in Slovakia were driven 
by both purely domestic considerations and accession into the European
Union’s (EU) Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
In the early years of transition the agricultural sector was adjusting to
major institutional reforms (transition from dictatorship to democracy and
from central planning to market economy). These reforms significantly in-
fluenced the production structure as farms started to adjust to market sig-
nals. Agriculture, however, remained one of the most regulated sectors in
the Slovak economy with a lot of influence from the state on production de-
cisions and the income of farmers.
Accession into the EU became the most significant factor influencing agri-
cultural policy in the second half of the nineties. EU accession involves both
changes in the policy instruments used for regulation as well as the level
of protection afforded to the sector.
Concurrently along with the reforms in Slovakia the EU have been re-
forming its CAP. In the CAP we observe transition from the highly distorted
price support to economically more efficient direct income support of far-
mers. The accession of Central and East European Countries into the EU
was one of the reasons for the CAP reforms. Budget consideration and WTO
negotiations are other reasons for the CAP reforms.
In general it is observed that the transformation of agriculture in Slo-
vakia, as well as other countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the EU
is mainly driven by political economy factors, while the effort to create
an economically efficient sector remains a secondary goal. The goal of
this paper is to analyse the reasons behind these reforms and to evaluate
the effects of various policy instruments used to regulate the agricultu-
ral sector in production, consumption and incomes of various interest 
groups.
We use a politician voter interaction model to shed light on the process of
forming agricultural policies. The model is based on Downs’ (1957) original
formulation as adjusted to analysing agricultural policies by Swinnen and
de Gorter (1993). Furthermore, partial equilibrium and static partial equi-
librium models with imperfections in the land and credit markets are used
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The second part of the paper evaluates the development of the Slovak
agricultural sector during the transition period and the concurrent deve-
lopment of the CAP. Part 3 of the paper analyses the impact of EU acces-
sion on the agricultural sector in Slovakia and makes predictions for the fu-
ture. The last section summarises the results and draws conclusions.
2. Agricultural Policies in Slovakia and European Union
2.1 The Development of Slovak Agriculture: From Socialism
to European Union
Swinnen (1996) as well as OECD (2001) divide the development of agri-
cultural policy in Central and East European Countries into three periods.
This is also applicable for Slovakia. The division is based on the policies that
were pursued by politicians in different stages of development of the econo-
my and agricultural sector. In their effort to maximise political support,
politicians choose agricultural policies – level of transfer of income to agri-
cultural sector.
To  evaluate the political economy of agricultural policy making in Slo-
vakia, we consider a political market of rational self-interested politicians
and fully informed rational citizens. Politicians maximise their votes while
voters’ support is a function of change in utility resulting from the govern-
ment’s policy. Politicians have redistributive policies (taxes and subsidies)
at their disposal. Politicians undertake a redistributive policy in order to
increase their votes. Citizens provide support if the policy helps them and
reduce their support if the policy is against them. Different marginal uti-
lity of incomes among different income groups allows politicians to increase
their votes through redistribution of income. Optimal redistribution occurs
when the marginal decrease of support from the taxed group (consumers
and taxpayers) equals a marginal increase of support from the subsidised
sector (farmers). According to thepolitician voter interaction model, thelevel
of transfers to the agricultural sector depends crucially on three factors:
the income disparity between the rural and urban population, the share of
agricultural population in the total population, and dead-weight costs as-
sociated with income transfer. The larger income disparity as a result of
the comparative disadvantages of agricultural production, the greater is
the politically optimal income transfer to the agricultural sector. Similarly,
the small size of the rural population is conducive to large income transfers
to theagricultural sector. Thereason is straightforward, to subsidise asmall
number of farmers requires low taxation of the rest of the population while
per capita transfers to farmers are high. Large dead-weight costs of income
transfers reduce politically optimal transfer levels.
The first stage of agricultural policy after 1989 was conducted within
the Czechoslovak Federation according to the Scenario of Economic Reform.
The objectives were to establish new legal subjects based on the private
ownership of land, to improve the market orientation of agricultural pro-
duction with the goal of creating stable market conditions, and to enhance
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to improve regional distribution of production according to natural and mar-
ket conditions.
The first stage of agricultural policy development can be named liberal.1
It was characterised by price and trade liberalisation. At the same time
the conditions for a real transfer of ownership rights to private hands were
created. As the agricultural sector was highly subsidised during socialism,
liberal reforms led to the reduction of agricultural terms of trade and the de-
crease of the relative income of farmers. Table 1 shows the negative deve-
lopment of relative agricultural wages which is a proxy for measurement
of income disparity.
Decline of relative agricultural wages created:
– pressure on decreasing production and departure of a large number of
agricultural employees from agriculture into other sectors of the economy
– economic pressure,
– pressure on increasing the redistribution of income into agriculture, and,
therefore, on a change of agricultural policy from relatively liberal to pro-
tectionist – political pressure.
The function of the political market was reflected in the change of agri-
cultural policy towards protectionism. Politicians realised that there was
a potential to increase political support through redistribution to the agri-
cultural sector where initial liberal policies decreased incomes. Anincreased
rural-urban income gap prompted the launch of protectionist policies by
self-interested politicians. This occurred in the second stage of the deve-
lopment of the agricultural policy in the Slovak Republic after 1989.
The second stage of agricultural policy development could have been re-
alised after Slovakia’s independance in 1993. During this stage agricultural
policy focused on thestabilisation of agricultural incomes and halting there-
duction of agricultural production. Protective measures were used to achieve
self-sufficiency in basic products and to develop agricultural production in
non-competitive, mainly mountain regions. Political focus was on the sup-
port of this part of the population (farming population) that suffered income
loss due to economic developments. Protective measures were adopted in
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1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Agriculture 3.410 3.645 3.886 4.047 4.481 5.127 5.766 6.502 7.261 7.826 8.390 9.076
Ag. wage 
as % of wage
in economy 110,4 113,3 103,7 91,8 85,1 83,2 80,7 79,1 77,6 76,6 76,7  76,5
TABLE 1 Average Nominal Monthly Wages and Relative Wages in Agriculture
Sources: ·tatistická roãenka SR, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 (ed. by Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic)
Pracovníci a priemerné mesaãné mzdy 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 a 1. polrok 1997. (ed. by Statistical Office
of the Slovak Republic)
Vybrané ekonomické ukazovatele a zamestnanci v poºnohospodárstve za SR za rok 1997. (ed. by Statisti-
cal Office of the Slovak Republic)
1 Agricultural policy in the first stage was liberal relative to previous agricultural policy that
enormously subsidised agricultural sector. It was not, however, liberal when compared to poli-
cies of free market.an ad hoc fashion. Stress was on political rather than economic objectives
of efficiency enhancement. At this stage agricultural policy was on the horns
of dilemma, as it wanted to achieve two quite different goals: to protect pro-
ducers and at the same time to support consumers, especially the low in-
come groups. Price support obviously could not achieve these two objectives,
as high prices are good for producers while making consumers worse off.
The state budget, rather than consumers, therefore provided agricultural
support.
The third stage of the development of the agricultural sector had the task
of preparing Slovakia’s agricultural sector for European Union (EU) mem-
bership. Its beginnings can be traced back to the second half of the nineties
and in particular, to the formation of the new government after the 1998
elections when it became clear that Slovakia would become an EU member.
Independent Slovak agricultural policy was replaced with a process of har-
monisation with the EU CAP. The Slovak government was constrained in
its choice of policy instruments. By the time of accession, Slovakia had to
adopt the instruments of the CAP. On the other hand the Slovak govern-
ment was still free to choose thepolitically most appropriate protection level
for the agricultural sector based on its own political considerations (choos-
ing such protection level that loss of support from taxed consumers and tax-
payers equals the gain of support from subsidised farmers). However, CAP
had a strong influence on the choice of the protection level, as farming or-
ganisations were using the fact that the EU support levels of far-
mers are much higher, to exert pressure on the government to increase do-
mestic support.
In the negotiation towards the adoption of CAP the Slovak government
was trying to improve as much as possible its net income position relative
to other EU members by bargaining for higher production quotas and higher
reference yields.
Here we can conclude that during the whole transition period agricultural
reforms were significantly constrained by political markets, i.e. by the in-
teraction of politicians and voters in the political arena. That is, adopted
policies reflected the interaction of individuals (citizens, politicians, bu-
reaucrats, lobbyists) in an institutional context of decisions. Rational indi-
viduals maximised their individual welfare subject to their budget con-
straints and voting power. Citizens maximised their utility, politicians
attempted to maximise voting preferences, bureaucrats tried to strengthen
their positions in administration, and pressure groups wanted favourable
tax or subsidy treatments.
In particular the development of agricultural policies depended crucially
on the income disparity between the rural agricultural population and
the urban non-agricultural population. As this disparity was growing, sup-
port maximising politicians provided more protectionist policies to the agri-
cultural sector rather than letting economic forces solve the problem by
a painful transformation. Similarly, the declining agricultural population
made the per capita income transfers less costly for the non-agricultural
population as subsidising small numbers of farmers requires the low taxa-
tion of the rest of the population while per capita transfers to farmers are
high. Large dead-weight costs that are always associated with redistribu-
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sidise the agricultural sector. On the other hand this was an impetus for
policy reform. These conclusions are in accordance with the Down’s eco-
nomic theory of democracy and the Swinnen and de Gorter’s model.
A negative impact of the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy
on the Slovak reforms is also observed. High support of EU agriculture
makes Slovak farmers less competitive on the world markets and also gives
farmers strong reasons to ask for higher domestic protection.
2.2 Development of the Common Agricultural Policy: 
From Coupled Support to Decoupling
The Common Agricultural Policy of the EU is an economic framework of
agricultural production and marketing which is constantly developing and
changing. The beginnings of the common agricultural policies date back to
the period of the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC,
1957). The Treaty of Rome, that established the EEC, focused specifically
on agriculture. According to the treaty, member states of the EEC removed
the quantitative trade and tariff barriers of agricultural products. Trading
with the rest of the world was subject to common external tariffs. Similar
liberalisation of intra-EU trade was also achieved in other sectors of
the economy. However, since agriculture was highly supported in all mem-
ber states prior to the creation of the EEC with the view to remaining pro-
tected in the future, there was a need to harmonise agricultural support
policies in order to sustain agricultural free trade within EC borders. This
was achieved by the formation of the common market organisation for ce-
reals in 1962, which was later adopted to other commodities. Common mar-
ket organisations were based on commodity price supports with import bar-
riers and export subsidies (along with output controls). High domestic price
and high border protection against foreign competition were guaranteed to
farmers. The domestic price was usually set above the world price while
high tariffs (initially levies) were imposed on imports in order to avoid
the import of cheap products to the common market from abroad. In com-
modities in which the EC/EU produced more than the domestic consump-
tion level, export subsidies were used to eliminate the surplus.
The EU’s price support mechanism implies a transfer of income from con-
sumers and taxpayers to farmers. Consumers pay higher prices than they
otherwise would pay without import tariffs, export subsidies, and some-
times alternative forms of production controls, such as production quotas2
or eliminating some land from production (set aside). Taxpayers finance
production and export subsidies and other policy instruments dealing with
excess production.
As a result of price support the EU was confronted with overproduction,
growing budgetary expenditures, and pressure from the WTO negotiations.
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2 The process of controlling output started in 1984 with the introduction of milk quotas. To con-
trol output for other products involved high transaction costs and therefore could not be suc-
cessfully implemented, for example for cereals.These problems were seriously dealt with for the first time by the Mac-
Sharry reforms of 1992. In order to reduce market imbalances, the price
support was reduced and compensatory payments to farmers were paid in-
stead. They were paid in the form of direct (budgetary) payments. The cal-
culation of these direct payments was based on historical production not
current production. Increasing current production does not increase direct
payments. However, farmers in order to be eligible for payments were
obliged to produce certain agricultural commodities but the payment did
not depend on the current level of production. This was an important move
for the CAP because a large part of subsidies were partly decoupled (not
linked) from the production. This in turn, less distorted the agricultural
markets that suffered from overproduction.
In theory, fully decoupled direct payments have no impact on production,
consumption, and trade. They do not create distortions in production or con-
sumption. Direct payments cause, however, distortions in taxation that are
proportional to government expenditures on direct payments. Partially de-
coupled direct payments are conditioned on producing at least some com-
modities and they are more distortive than fully decoupled direct payments
but less distortive than fully coupled payments.
In practice fully decoupled direct payments have some production effects.
First, they are still linked to maintaining land in good condition. Second,
the risk averse producers increase production because of the wealth effect
of direct payments. Thirdly, direct payments may allow financing invest-
ment activities when there are imperfect credit markets. Fourth, there is
a policy risk that the base for computing direct payments will be changed
in the future.
Agenda 2000, as agreed by the European Council in Berlin in 1999, went
further in the direction of replacing market price support with direct pay-
ments. Additional price cuts were brought forward and more support to
farmers was given in the form of direct payments.
Another important factor that pushed the reformation of the CAP was
the future enlargement of the EU by Central and Eastern European Coun-
tries (CEECs). As the agriculture absorbs around half of the EU budget,
there were concerns that the integration of the large CEECs agricultural
sector may cause significant changes in the budgetary expenditures. Also,
there were two other important factors that had to be taken into conside-
ration: (a) lower agricultural prices in CEECs and (b) lower level of agri-
cultural support in CEECs. Upon accession the adjustment of the support
and prices to the EU level was expected to cause a large increase in pro-
duction. On the other hand the food demand was expected to decline be-
cause of an increase in food prices. The effect then, would be an accumula-
tion of a huge excess supply, which was feared, to flood markets in Western
European countries – see for instance (Tangermann – Josling, 1994), (Her-
tel et al., 1997), (Frohberg et al., 1998), (Munch, 2000).
The MacSharry and Agenda 2000 reforms involved thereduction of thedo-
mestic price which improved the market balance. As a consequence there
was less excess production in the domestic market that had to be sold in
the world market. This in turn had a beneficial effect on EU consumers and
also on world producers as the world price went up. However the budgetary
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of the CAP costs, as the direct payments became one of the most important
instrument within the CAP. Thus, overall there was a shift from the fi-
nancing of agricultural support from consumers to taxpayers.
The trend of replacing price support with direct income support conti-
nues. In 2003 Commissioner Fischler proposed further decoupling within
Mid Term Review of the CAP, known also as Fischler’s reform or the Lu-
xembourg Agreement. Asingle farm payment independent from production
was introduced, substituting most of the commodity specific coupled pay-
ments while themarket price support was further reduced. Single farm pay-
ment is linked to the respect of environmental, food safety, animal and plant
health and animal welfare standards, as well as the requirement to keep
all farmland in good agricultural and environmental condition (“cross-com-
pliance”). There are, therefore, two excuses for the direct farm payments.
First, direct payments are used to increase farm incomes. Second, direct
payments are viewed as payment for producing positive externalities such
as preserving the environment.
The decoupling of subsidies from production is expected to restore mar-
ket balance by forcing farmers to react to market signals and to adapt
the production structure in order to reflect consumers’ preferences. The de-
coupling of subsidies will give freedom to farmers to produce or to be in-
volved in any agricultural activity, because they will be granted direct pay-
ments irrespective of whether they produce or not. As a result their decision
will be based on the profitability of productive activities rather than on go-
vernment decisions to subsidise certain commodities. It is expected that
some of the agricultural land will not be used and will be abandoned, espe-
cially in mountainous regions with low soil quality, were agricultural pro-
duction is not profitable. For the impact of decoupling on agricultural mar-
kets see, for instance (European Commission, 2003).
In conclusion, the EU’s CAP is being transformed from a highly distortive
price support system to a less distortive income support system. There is
a reform involving a change in policy instruments used to support farmers.
On the other hand the CAP still affords a high level of protection to the agri-
cultural sector through direct income support which causes budgetary pro-
blems.
3. Impacts of EU Accession on the Slovak Agriculture
Slovakia loses its independent national agricultural policy in theEU. This
means that further reforms of the Slovak agriculture can occur only when
the whole CAP is reformed. The Slovakian government will have less fle-
xibility to make independent adjustments in the agricultural sector because
the level of support, as well as policy instruments, will be fixed at the EU
level. Adjustments of policies to local conditions will, therefore, be minimal.3
Because current EU members prefer higher protection of agriculture than
Slovakia it is expected that no reforms will take place in Slovakia that would
decrease budgetary expenditures on agriculture.4 However, there are still
negotiations concerning the net contribution position of member states to
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mon EU budget while others are net beneficiaries of common policies. Slo-
vakia is expected to be a net beneficiary of the agricultural policies. That
is, Slovakia is compensated for agreeing to support farmers more than its
political optimal support level.
Budgetary expenditures (Table 2) are high in the EU because of the domi-
nant position of direct payments in agricultural support policies. The level
of direct payments for accessioning states was the most controversial issue
in the negotiation. In the EU, direct payments were initially granted to
farmers to compensate them for price cuts introduced by the MacSharry re-
forms and Agenda 2000 and to pay farmers for the provision of positive ex-
ternalities. On the other hand, agricultural prices in Slovakia and other ac-
cessioning states were not expected to decrease. Therefore, there was no
rationale for compensation. Moreover, high direct payments might slow
down the restructuring process of the agricultural sector in the CEECs be-
cause large lump-sum transfers will inhibit the motivation of farmers to re-
structure their farms. Current member states were also opposed to large
direct payments, because their net contribution position relative to the EU
budget would deteriorate.
On the other hand, direct payments have some impact on the competi-
tiveness of farms and if farmers in CEECs receive less direct payments than
their counterparts in current member states their competitiveness will be
lower than that of current EU member state farmers, ceteris paribus. This
impact, however, is limited as direct payments are decoupled from produc-
tion. Using these arguments, the European Commission succeeded to push
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EC 9 EC 10 EC 12 EU 15 EU 25
1973 1980 1985 1986 1992 1996 2002 2004
Expenditures
(in bill. EUR) 3.6 11.3 19.7 22.1 31.2 40.8 47.2 49.3
Share of total
EU budget (in %) 77 68 68 62 52 48 49 43
TABLE 2 EU Budget Expenditure on Agriculture
Source: European Commission: The community budget: the facts in figures, 2000; Press releases on EU budget:
various dates.
3 There is some flexibility in the overall CAP framework. For example, EU 15 countries can
opt either for full decoupling or partial decoupling for some commodities. That is full decou-
pling is a general principle while Member States can decide to maintain proportion of direct
payments coupled. For cereals, oilseed and protein crops 25 % of direct payments might be
linked to production or alternatively 40 % of supplementary durum wheat aid can be coupl-
ed. Another option of coupling direct payments to production includes 50 % of the sheep and
goat premia, 100 % of suckling cow premium and 40 % of slaughter premium or 100% of
slaughter premium with up to 75% of the special male premium. In the dairy sector mem-
ber states can opt for decoupling either in 2005 or at latest in 2007. Furthermore, in Aegean
Islands drying aid, seeds and direct payments need not be integrated in the single farm pay-
ment.
4 National top-ups of direct payments (Table 3), on the other hand, provide some flexibility to
adjustments of level of support of farmers in the transition period until 2013 as only upper li-
mits to top-ups are fixed.forward its proposal to partially introduce direct payments. The direct pay-
ments will start at 25 % of the EU level in 2004 and then continuously in-
crease such that in 2013 they will reach the full level. However, national
budgetary resources can be used to increase them by an additional 30 %
(Table 3).
Relative to the situation before accession, direct payment will increase.
The group that is expected to benefit the most from direct payments are
landowners (Ciaian – Swinnen, 2003). Direct payments are distributed to
the agricultural sector on a per hectare basis. The more land a farmer 
cultivates the higher direct payments he or she obtains. This increases
the value of land. Competition for land among farmers will lead to an in-
crease of land rent or land prices benefiting landowners.
The study of Ciaian, Swinnen and Munch (2002) estimated the impact of
accession on Slovakia into the EU on the incomes of different owners of agri-
cultural factors. They used a static partial equilibrium model with imper-
fections on the land and credit markets. The model was calibrated with data
from 1999. Their model considers the following market participants: one
domestic consumer, foreign consumers, one representative farm, agricul-
tural input suppliers (agricultural factor input owners) and government, all
assumed to behave competitively, except for market imperfections in land
and credit markets, and government, which exogenously imposes its poli-
cies. There is assumed one product in the market, which is the monetary
value of farm production (crop and livestock production). Credit rationing
is assumed in the credit market and the concept of transaction costs is used
to address the issue of land market imperfection. Market imperfection in
the land market is mostly related to the presence of large co-operative and
corporate farms and the large fragmentation of ownership rights. Imper-
fections in the labour market were not dealt with.
The total agricultural income and farmers’ income are expected to in-
crease, by 56 % and by 47 % respectively (Table 4). Landowners income will
rise between 47 % and 773 % depending whether the farmer owns the land
or non-farmers own the land. The study further shows that other agents
that are involved in agriculture will also profit from enlargement throug
capitalization of support in prices of their inputs supplied to the sector.
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From EU budget From national budget TOTAL
(“top-up”)
2004 25 30 55
2005 30 30 60
2006 35 30 65
2007 40 30 70
2008 50 30 80
2009 60 30 90
2010 70 30 100
2011 80 20 100
2012 90 10 100
2013 100 0 100
TABLE 3 Phasing-in Schedule for Direct Payments after Accession (in % of EU level)
Source: European Commission: Accession Treaty, 2003.The income of labour hired in the sector will increase by 76 % and the in-
come of capital owners will rise by 56 %. The European Commission (2002)
reports a higher increase in the total agricultural income after accession.
According to its estimates theincome will increase between 148% and 164%
for the case of farmers being granted full level of direct payments, and by
45 % in the case of not getting the full level of direct payments.
Concerning production developments after accession, the European Com-
mission (2002) estimates a 36% increase of crop production and a 12–13%
increase of livestock production, again for full level of direct payments. With-
out direct payments production would increase by around the same amount,
by 30 % for crop production and by 12 % for livestock production.
Pokrivcak, Bartova and Ciaian (2004) using a dynamic econometric mo-
del, estimated the impact of Slovakia’s accession into EU on the agricultu-
ral sector. They used a partial equilibrium model developed as part of 
the AGMEMOD project. The model includes major agricultural commodi-
ties (wheat, maize, cattle…) inter-linked through cross price elasticities and
cross elasticities for land, reflecting competition of different sectors for land
resources. There are also links between the crop and livestock sectors. Each
sector is represented by supply and demand relationships that take into
consideration the specific processes within each sector. These relationships
are estimated or elasticities from economic literature. Most CAP policies
are incorporated in the model.5
The following three simulation scenarios are considered: a Non-accession
scenario, a Non-Decoupling scenario and a Decoupling scenario.
– the “Non-accession” scenario assumes no EU accession and unchanged
agricultural policies in Slovakia. This scenario was included for the sake
of comparison.
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Base year 1999 Accession
Farmers’ income 100 147
of which:
Labour income 100 151
Income from owned land 100 873
Variable capital income 100 132
Investment capital income 100 145
Hired labour income 100 176
Landowners’ rental income  100 147
Variable capital suppliers’ income 100 156
Total agricultural income 100 156
TABLE 4 Estimation of Income Change in Slovakia after Accession (base year = 100)
Source: (Ciaian – Swinnen – Munch, 2002)
5 All projections of the model, however, must be taken with care. First, relatively short time se-
ries were used to estimate elasticities or elasticities were adopted from literature. Second, there
will be substantial institutional changes related to EU accession. Third, the model is not based
on micro foundations. Fourth, the model does not take into consideration the future develop-
ment of the retail market. Given these weaknesses, the model is however appropriate for pro-
viding sound general projections as well as the impact of desired policy scenarios on the direc-
tion of change of the agricultural markets.430 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 54, 2004, ã. 9-10
FIGURE 1 Wheat Production (1990 = 100 %)
FIGURE 2 Maize Production (1990 = 100 %)
FIGURE 3 Beef Meat Production (1990 = 100 %)
FIGURE 4 Sheep Meat Production (1990 = 100 %)
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No-accession                   No-Decoupling                 Decoupling– the “Non-Decoupling” scenario assumes the implementation of the CAP
with coupled direct payments introduced at 25 % of the EU level plus 30 %
top-ups in 2004 and then being gradually increased in the following years
as in the accession agreement. Prices are assumed to converge to EU le-
vels one year after accession. Up to 2004, the policies are the same as in
theNon-accession scenario. After 2004 policies are thesame as per Agenda
2000. That is farmers receive payments in respect of certain crops and
animals (arable crops, beef and veal animals, sheep and goats). The level
of direct payments depends on species and on historical reference yield.
– the “Decoupling” scenario assumes the implementation of the CAP but
with decoupled direct payments. However a slight impact of direct pay-
ments on production was considered due to the earlier mentioned reasons.
Compared to the Non-Decoupling scenario, a decrease of the EU inter-
vention prices by 5 % is assumed. The assumptions on the remaining vari-
ables are the same as in the Non-Decoupling scenario.
For all three scenarios the projections are made until 2010.
As for the development of macro variables after 2001 the following pro-
jections are used:
– For inflation rate and GDP growth rate, Eurostat forecasts are used:
an average of 5.2% inflation rate and a moderate GDP growth (3 % on
average).
– For population development, theUN forecast is used which predicts avery
small population growth.
– For the Slovak currency exchange rate against the Euro and dollar, SAV
(Ústav svetovej ekonomiky – World Economics Institute) forecasts are
used: appreciation of the Slovak currency against both the Euro and dol-
lar.
Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 show the impact of accession on the production of
wheat, maize, beef and lamb, respectively. The decoupling scenario results
in a lower production level than the no-decoupling scenario. This is mainly
due to the de-linking of subsidies from production. Non-accession would
make the producers worse off. They would attain lower production levels in
almost ever year after 2003 as compared to accession.
Decoupled direct payments and the common EU market may lead to spe-
cialisation on a European level as well as in Slovakia. Decisions on pro-
duction will be driven less by political factors, and more by market signals
and available endowments of production factors. More capital intensive
farming systems are expected to emerge in Western Europe especially in
capital abundant countries, while extensive farming systems are expected
to emerge in Central and Eastern Europe. Within Slovakia, crop produc-
tion is expected to dominate southern agricultural areas with fertile land
while a shift to livestock production accompanied by the conversion of ar-
able land to grassland is predicted in the northern less fertile regions.
Compared to the current situation agricultural prices will increase. Fi-
gure 5 shows the past and projected Slovak prices as a percentage of the EU
intervention prices. For most years agricultural prices were below 90 % of
the EU intervention prices. The most notable difference is for animal pro-
ducts. For instance, in the period 1993–2002 beef prices in Slovakia was
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crease as Figure 5 further shows for the non-decoupling scenario again fol-
lowing the study of Pokrivcak, Bartova and Ciaian (2004).
Due to this developments, per capita consumption declines after acces-
sion. As Figures 6, 7 and 8 show, the consumption of wheat, beef and milk,
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FIGURE5 Slovak Prices as Percentage of theEU Intervention Price (intervention price=100%)
FIGURE 6 Wheat per capita Consumption (1990 = 100 %)
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No-accession                   No-Decoupling                 Decouplingrespectively, in accession scenarios (Decoupling and Non-Decoupling) is
much lower than in the Non-accession scenario (Pokrivcak – Bartova –
Ciaian, 2004). The highest difference is for beef followed by milk, while
there is only slight difference for wheat. This is mainly due to the high-
er price increase of beef and milk after accession as compared to wheat
prices.
Food prices will also increase due to the application of stricter hygiene
and quality requirements. Health standards, animal welfare, and environ-
mental standards pertaining to the classification of agricultural and food
production will increase. This will also have animpact on prices and thecom-
petitiveness of the food processing industry. BoÏik (2002) estimates that
the costs in the meat processing industry will increase by 1,3–1,5 %, in
the milk processing industry by 1,2–1,4 %, and the chicken processing in-
dustry by 0,9–1,1 %. Farmers will feel indirect effects, as part of the cost
increase will be transferred back to them.
The increase of market prices will have a positive impact on the produc-
tion and profits of Slovak producers. The welfare of domestic agricultural
producers will increase due to higher prices. On the other hand, higher pri-
ces will cause welfare losses to consumers.
4. Summary and Conclusions
Agricultural policy formation was driven mostly by political considera-
tions in Slovakia with relatively low emphasis on economic efficiency.
The development of the political market was critical for the development of
the agricultural policy. The power of farmers and their lobbyist groups is
stronger than that of other sectors.
The development of thecommon agricultural policy of theEuropean Union
had a strong influence on Slovak agricultural policy. Slovakia had to adopt
CAP by the time of accession. This fact was used by farming organisations
for pressurising the government to increase the protection rate long before
accession.
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No-accession                   No-Decoupling                 DecouplingFurther reforms of the Slovak agricultural sector will be possible only
within the overall reform of the CAP. However, since the protection of far-
mers is higher in the EU than in accessioning states, significant reforms to
Slovak agriculture are not expected in the near future.
In the European Union CAP reform has been taking place since the early
nineties. While protection rates remained stable, policy instruments sup-
ported changes from price support to direct income support.
Direct income support is less distortive than equivalent price support. In-
come support enables market price signals to determine production struc-
ture, rather than the government. The reform of the policy instruments is
important. Atransfer to amore efficient instrument used to support theagri-
cultural sector has a potential to make every group better off.
The decoupling of subsidies from production, results in lower production
levels, than linking subsidies to prices. Additionally, decoupling leads to
the specialisation of production within the EU as well as within individual
member states based on comparative advantages.
Agricultural prices are expected to increase when Slovakia joins the EU.
Higher agricultural prices will be reflected in higher food prices. Food prices
are expected also to increase due to the application of stricter hygiene and
quality requirements.
The income of owners of agricultural factors of production is expected to
increase after EU accession. The welfare of consumers is expected to de-
crease, ceteris paribus, with the adoption of the Common Agricultural 
Policy.
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SUMMARY
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This paper analysis the development of Slovak agriculture during the coun-
try’s economic transition and during the parallel reforms of the common agricul-
tural policy (CAP) of the European Union from a political-economy perspective. Agri-
cultural-policy formation in Slovakia and the EU has been driven largely by political
considerations, with relatively low emphasis on economic efficiency. CAP will have
a profound effect on agricultural prices and on production and consumption levels
in Slovakia. Agricultural producers’ income is expected to increase, while consumer
welfare is expected to decline due to the CAP.
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